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Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? 
Evidence from UK Public Firms 
Abstract 
Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they 
design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the 
FTSE All-Share Index over the 2003-2011 period, we show a positive correlation between 
the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is 
somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling 
strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO 
compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g., during the post-
financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In 
addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than 
managerial power theory, but we caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note 
that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based 
on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference-in-differences), and 
that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same 
level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.  
 





This paper investigates the relations among compensation consultants, CEO pay, and 
managerial incentives. Specifically, we address whether the presence of consultants tends to 
raise CEO pay and/or change the structure of incentive-based pay. The central issue is 
whether pay consultants impede or improve compensation arrangements in the boardroom. 
Our paper augments the literature on compensation consultants and CEO compensation 
(Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Armstrong, Ittner, and 
Larcker, 2012). 
Studying compensation consultants is important because their roles in setting CEO pay 
is controversial (Waxman, 2007). Managerial power theorists argue that compensation 
consultants are captured by powerful CEOs leading to non-optimal and excessive executive 
compensation arrangements (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Waxman, 2007). In consequence, 
executive pay arrangements favour CEOs at the expense of owners and society. Agency 
theorists, in contrast, argue that pay consultants use their expertise to align the interests of 
owners and managers and help alleviate moral hazard risks arising from the separation of 
ownership and control. In this view, CEO pay arrangements are largely optimal, and ae set 
against inevitable contracting costs (Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2010). There 
is thus a tension between these two theories, in principle, can be addressed empirically. 
Disentangling these two claims is fraught with difficulty, not least because the firm’s 
selection of consultants is endogenous and/or prone to other statistical biases arising from 
omitted variable bias. This paper aims to address these issues. 
Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature on pay and governance. 
First, we contribute to the extant compensation consultant literature by showing that the 
ability to establish a correlation between CEO pay and pay consultants is highly sensitive to 
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the type of econometric method used. Specifically, the long panel of data on UK publicly-
traded firms enables us to test both the cross-sectional and time series relationships between 
CEO compensation and compensation consultants. Prior research has largely focused only on 
the cross-sectional variation in the pay and compensation consultant relationship. Our cross-
sectional OLS results show that the presence of consultants is positively associated with both 
level of compensation and percentage of incentive-based pay, consistent with prior literature 
(e.g., Conyon et al., 2009; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and Walker, 2010). However, by 
exploiting the time series nature of the data, we show that these findings do not adequately 
control for firm-specific heterogeneity in corporate culture, managerial quality, or the 
endogenous selection of consultants. When we control for these factors, the effect of 
consultants on CEO pay is much less clear-cut. To elaborate, we find that the effect of pay 
consultants on the level of CEO pay and the structure of CEO incentives disappears after 
controlling for firm- and CEO-level fixed effects.  
Second, given the presence of compensation consultants is endogenous, we do not 
consider findings from the OLS / FE models sufficiently convincing as a way to isolate the 
causal effect of consultants on CEO pay. We therefore use more compelling econometric 
methodologies including propensity score matching to optimally identify similar consultant 
and non-consultant firms and isolate the average treatment effect of the compensation 
consultants on CEO pay (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Moreover, we follow this up by using a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator utilizing 
the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to observe CEO pay adjustments. While the 
economic magnitude of the consultant effect decreases, we document a positive link between 
the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay using the propensity score matching 
method. We also find that the presence of compensation consultants increases CEO pay in the 
post-2008 financial crisis period. The impact is mainly driven by an increased proportion of 
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equity-based pay. This suggests that compensation consultants helped firms re-arrange their 
executive compensation packages to gain back the public’s confidence after the financial 
crisis. 
Third, we investigate the contexts in which compensation consultant advice matters. 
We also show that compensation consultants affect the level of CEO pay and the structure of 
incentives when their expertise is more likely to be important. Specifically, we find that the 
effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay is driven by their impact on firms with 
observable ex-ante weak compensation policies. This is consistent with the expectation that 
shareholders face greater moral hazard risks in firms with weak compensation policies, and 
that these firms are more likely to rely on and benefit from consultants’ advice.  
Fourth, we add to prior findings in the literature by showing that there is a positive 
relation between consultants and CEO pay-performance sensitivity, indicating that the CEO 
pay is more linked to performance (both stock returns and return on assets) in firms that 
retain compensation consultants.  
Finally, we conduct a battery of additional analysis to investigate the effects of 
compensation consultants’ quality on CEO pay, the determinants of changes in compensation 
consultants, the effect of internal adviser and compensation committee characteristics on 
CEO pay, as well as the effects of consultants on CEO pay in firms across different 
regulatory regimes. Our evidence adds to the wider corporate governance literature, with a 
special focus on executive compensation (e.g., Skovoroda and Bruce, 2017; Stathopoulos and 
Voulgaris, 2016). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
relevant literature and develops our main hypotheses. The third section describes the sample 
selection, statistical methodologies, and measurement of variables used in our empirical 
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analysis. The fourth section presents the summary statistics and empirical results, while the 
fifth section contains some additional relevant findings. The sixth section concludes. 
COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS AND EXECUTIVE LABOR MARKETS 
The Role of Compensation Consultants 
Compensation consultants are retained by a firm’s board of directors to assist in 
structuring CEO and other executives’ compensation. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) 
were among the first to point out the importance of consultants in designing compensation 
contracts to motivate CEOs, arguing that they supply valuable market information to boards. 
Main et al. (2008) document the critical role compensation consultants play both in providing 
market data and in putting forth ideas on compensation design. 
The academic literature is divided on the precise role of compensation consultants, as 
well as on their effects. On the one hand, the managerial power view argues that they can be 
assailed by powerful CEOs, which ultimately leads to inefficient pay contracts that are 
incongruent with shareholder interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). In this framework, pay 
consultants facilitate CEO rent-seeking behaviour. Several rationales support this view.  
First, the repeat business hypothesis argues that a compensation consultant who 
recommends a low level of CEO compensation is unlikely to win favour with a powerful 
CEO. Second, the cross-selling hypothesis argues that a conflict of interest arises from 
supplying different services to the client firm. A consultant might receive lucrative fees from 
these other services. Therefore, when recommending CEO pay, the consultant may be 
considering the fees arising from the non-CEO pay consulting services (Conyon, 2014; 
Conyon et al., 2011; Murphy and Sandino, 2010).  
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In contrast, the optimal contracting view argues that firms and boards use compensation 
consultants because they optimise the structure of pay packages (Conyon et al., 2009). 
Specifically, pay consultants work with an independent compensation committee to evaluate 
and propose appropriate executive compensation contracts. In consequence, they more 
effectively align the interests of shareholders and managers, while reducing latent moral 
hazard in the principal-agent relationship (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Consultants have 
powerful incentives to supply accurate and unbiased information to client firms because they 
could suffer reputation loss in the market otherwise, and could even jeopardise potential 
future business. This is also a serious risk if shareholder outrage ensues from, e.g., overly 
high CEO compensation levels. Therefore, the economic view asserts that consultants are 
used because the incremental benefits of their use are greater than the costs, and that 
consultants have appropriate incentives to serve client firms’ shareholder interests. 
Ogden and Watson (2012) also explore the complexities of the interaction between 
compensation committees and consultants. Using case study evidence, they argue that 
compensation committees are proactive in managing pay policy rather than being passively 
influenced by compensation consultants. Therefore, the precise effect of compensation 
consultants on the level and structure of CEO pay is an open empirical question. There is a 
growing body of literature on this topic, which is summarised briefly below. The primary 
finding is a positive relation between CEO pay and consultants. However, it is difficult to 
interpret that association because of the methods used in existing studies. The goal of this 
paper is to provide additional empirical evidence on the effect of compensation consultants 
with a range of identification approaches. Specifically, we apply panel data fixed effects 
models, propensity score matching models, and difference-in-differences models to explore 
whether and how compensation consultants influence the level and structure of CEO 
compensation. 
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Previous Research and Hypotheses 
Several extant studies provide empirical evidence that CEO pay levels are higher when 
firms retain compensation consultants (Conyon et al., 2009; Armstrong et al., 2012; Murphy 
and Sandino, 2010). The evidence is (partially) consistent with managerial power theory and 
rent-seeking behaviour by CEOs. Moreover, this phenomenon has attracted the criticism of 
policy makers. For example, in the United States, the Waxman Commission criticised pay 
consultants, and argued that they had contributed significantly to the growth in CEO pay. 
However, it is far from clear that there is a causal relation between compensation consultants 
and CEO pay. The association may simply reflect the endogenous selection of pay 
consultants, or reverse causality. For example, firms with highly paid CEOs may simply be 
more likely to retain expert consultants to ensure the optimal design of complex employment 
and pay contracts. Alternatively, the statistical methods used by extant studies (e.g., based on 
cross-sectional techniques) may be prone to specification errors and hence potential statistical 
biases. 
Overall, existing studies provide mixed evidence and explanations for the relation 
between CEO pay and compensation consultants. Murphy and Sandino (2010) argue that 
using compensation consultants may lead to higher recommended levels of pay if the 
consultants face potential conflicts of interest, such as a desire to “cross-sell” services and to 
secure “repeat business.” They find supporting evidence in both the US and Canada in 2006. 
However, contrary to expectations, they find higher CEO pay in US firms when the 
consultant works for the board rather than for management. Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 
(2010) study 755 firms from the S&P 1500 in 2006, and find no evidence that consultants 
with potential conflicts of interest drive up levels of pay or induce lower CEO pay-
performance sensitivities. This casts doubt on the effect of compensation consultants with 
conflicts of interest.  
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The positive statistical association between CEO pay and compensation consultants 
also depends crucially on the measure of pay. Some studies consider the structure of CEO 
compensation, and find that the association is driven largely by a higher proportion of 
performance-related, equity-based compensation, which is more aligned with optimal 
contract theory (Conyon et al., 2009; Voulgaris et al., 2010). This is important, as 
compensation levels can increase overall, but if the balance of compensation shifts away from 
the fixed component of salaries and toward an equity-based component, this would be 
evidence against the managerial power view. 
The statistical techniques used by researchers also matter. The studies mentioned thus 
far typically use one- or two-year cross-sectional data. This enables them to provide only 
correlation analysis, but may not provide enough solid evidence. A limited number of US and 
UK studies have been conducted with short length time series panel data, but the empirical 
findings remained inconclusive (Cai, Kini, and Williams, 2016; Chu, Faasse, and Rau, 2017; 
Goh and Gupta, 2010; Kabir and Minhat, 2014; Murphy and Sandino, 2015).  
Some studies have also expanded the standard research hypothesis (e.g., what is the 
direct effect of consultants on CEO pay) in various directions. Chu et al. (2017) investigate 
how the 2009 SEC ruling on the disclosure of non-compensation consultant fees affects the 
influence of compensation consultants on CEO pay. They provide more nuanced empirical 
evidence that some firms may retain compensation consultants to design optimal pay, while 
others may do it to justify higher pay. Cai et al. (2016) use a large sample of US public firms 
to study the effect of compensation consultants’ distinct styles. They conclude that the role of 
compensation consultants agrees with the efficient contracting view.  
Given the mixed results found in the existing literature, a genuine puzzle remains as to 
the precise effect that compensation consultants have on CEO pay. Motivated by the 
inconclusive body of empirical findings, this paper uses a unique set of panel data on UK 
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publicly traded firms to explore these issues. The panel covers data over the nine-year period 
from 2003 to 2011, and includes all UK FTSE All-Share firms. Our goal is to document the 
empirical relations among pay consultants and CEO pay levels and structure. We propose and 
test the following main hypotheses: 
H1a: The level of CEO compensation is positively associated to the presence of 
compensation consultants. 
H1b: The positive association between CEO compensation and the presence of compensation 
consultants is driven by the percentage of incentive-based pay. 
An important empirical challenge is the econometric identification of the “consultant 
effect,” because the choice of retaining a compensation consultant may be endogenous 
(Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012). In other words, 
companies that hire pay consultants differ on other key dimensions from those that do not. 
Ideally, we would like to randomly assign consultants to firms in order to identify the causal 
treatment effect of consultants on CEO pay.  
In the absence of random assignment, however, and with the necessity of addressing the 
endogeneity problem, this paper uses a range of empirical strategies. We first present 
standard OLS and fixed effects models to provide a “benchmark” against which to compare 
previous studies. Since these models are likely to be contaminated by issues such as omitted 
variables bias problems and potential persistence of the presence of compensation 
consultants, we stress this is for comparison purposes only.  
Next, the more compelling empirical evidence we present is based on propensity score 
matching, which optimally identifies similar consultant and non-consultant firms. We then 
present the average treatment effect of the consultant on CEO pay (Angrist and Pischke, 
2009; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We subsequently use a difference-in-differences 
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strategy to observe how CEO pay adjusts from the period before the 2008 financial crisis to 
the period afterward. The use of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences 
strategies provide the most compelling evidence of the causal effect of consultants on CEO 
pay. 
From an optimal contracting perspective, if compensation consultants provide advice 
based on firm characteristics, then their effect is likely to disappear after controlling for 
omitted variables. However, from a managerial power perspective, if compensation 
consultants recommend excessive CEO pay after having taken into account firm 
characteristics, then the effect will persist. Generally, we hypothesise that: 
H2: Compensation consultants exhibit a positive effect on CEO pay after controlling for the 
omitted variable bias and/or selection effects. 
In addition, we test whether the quality of firms’ ex-ante compensation policies affects 
the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay. Prior literature suggests 
governance quality is an important factor in understanding the role of compensation 
consultants. It also supports the managerial view that their effect is more likely to be abused 
in poorly governed firms (Armstrong et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2016; Cho, Hyun, and Shin, 
2015). In this paper, we intend to provide direct analysis by focusing on the role of firms’ ex-
ante compensation policies in order to test the following hypothesis: 
H3: The positive effects of compensation consultants on CEO pay and incentives are stronger 
in firms with weak compensation policies. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Data Sources and Sample 
We combine data from four separate sources to generate a significant and unique 
dataset that will allow us to examine the relation between CEO pay and the presence of 
compensation consultants. CEO compensation levels, incentives, and corporate governance 
characteristics come from BoardEx. The compensation consultant data come from Manifest. 
Manifest data has been used in previous prominent corporate governance studies (Conyon et 
al., 2009; Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright, 2009; Gregory-Smith, Main, and O’Reilly, 
2014). The economic variables we use here come from Datastream. Finally, the 
compensation policy quality data come from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
ASSET4 is the leading provider of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) 
data. It gathers extensive objective, quantitative, and qualitative ESG data on 3,100 global 
companies, and scores them from 0 to 100 on four pillars: Environmental, Social, Corporate 
Governance, and Economic. In the UK, ASSET4 has covered the FTSE 250 since fiscal year 
2002.  
Our sample is based on the population of the FTSE All-Share UK firms from 2003 to 
2011. This is important, because the FTSE All-Share Index captures 98% of the UK’s market 
capitalisation, and consists of the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250, and the FTSE Small Cap 
Indexes. The FTSE 100 contains the 100 largest firms in terms of market capitalisation; the 
FTSE 250 contains the next largest 250 firms; and the FTSE Small Caps contain smaller 
firms. We exclude investment trusts and firms with missing data. We then manually identify 
the CEO of each firm by using BoardEx, Manifest, and corporate annual reports. The final 
sample consists of 4,480 firm-year observations, with 748 unique firms and 1,236 unique 
CEOs.  
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The UK provides an important context for our study. First, the UK disclosure 
requirements relating to compensation consultants, such as the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations (UK Government, 2002), have a longer history than in the US. This 
permits the collection of time series data to test our hypotheses across different model 
selections. Second, the level of UK disclosure requirements relating to executive 
compensation is high (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). Third, UK regulations on 
executive compensation date back to at least the 1990s, with the Cadbury committee report 
on corporate governance in 1992 and the Greenbury Committee on executive pay in 1995. 
This history has served to bolster social and cultural norms relating to the putative 
appropriateness of pay outcomes in a UK context (Conyon, Core, and Guay, 2010). 
Empirical Models 
To test the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay levels and financial 
incentives, we first estimate the following pooled OLS regression model. This is consistent 
with prior studies: 
yi,t = a + bConsultanti,t + gControlsi,t + Industryt + Yeart + ei,t    (1) 
where yit stands for compensation measures such as “CEO compensation” and “CEO pay 
structure,” each measured for CEO of firm “i” at time “t.” The term Consultanti,t is an 
indicator variable of the compensation consultant that equals 1 if the firm uses any 
compensation consultants, and 0 otherwise. The compensation consultant measure varies 
across individual firms “i” and time “t.” The definitions of the main variables are in the 
appendix. We a set of industry dummies (Industryt) to capture inter-industry differences in 
the demand for executive talent and a set of year time dummies (Yeart) to capture the effects 
of macroeconomic shocks.  
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The estimation of Equation (1), however, does not allow for separate intercepts (i.e., 
firm-fixed effects), and assumes that the presence of consultants is exogenous. Thus, a 
primary concern is that the effect of the compensation consultant variable may be 
contaminated by the omission of firm-fixed effects, missing variables, and the fundamentally 
endogenous selection of the pay consultant.1 Such problems may lead to statistical biases and 
are very difficult to fully resolve. One way to at least partially handle the identification issue 
is to conceptualise it as an econometric “omitted variable” problem. The application of firm-
fixed effects to some extent controls for any unobserved, non-time-varying firm-specific 
factors that may influence CEO pay and incentives. Therefore, we estimate the following 
general panel data econometric model: 
yi,t = aFirmi + bConsultanti,t + gControlsi,t + Yeart + ei,t                  (2) 
The term aFirmi is a set of firm-fixed effects. This specification helps mitigate 
statistical biases associated with firm-level omitted variables that may be important for 
compensation arrangements (e.g., the stock of a firm’s reputation, or unmeasured firm 
capabilities). 
Furthermore, consider that approximately 12% of our firm-year observations feature a 
CEO turnover event (541 of 4,480), it is essential to examine CEO-fixed effects regressions 
in addition to the more common firm-fixed effects regressions. Hence, we also apply CEO-
fixed effects in order to control for unobservable CEO-specific time-invariant characteristics 
with the following model: 
yi,t = aCEOi + bConsultanti,t + gControlsi,t + Yeart + ei,t                  (3) 
                                               
1 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting tests for endogeneity. We performed a Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test, which is an augmented regression test for endogeneity (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). The test indicates 
that OLS is not consistent, suggesting a potential endogeneity issue. We also performed a Hausman test, which 
suggests that a fixed effects model, rather than a random effects model, would be more appropriate. 
16 
The term aCEOi is a set of CEO-fixed effects. This specification helps mitigate 
statistical biases associated with CEO-level omitted variables (e.g., CEO talent, appetite for 
risk). 
To further address the endogenous selection of pay consultants, we use propensity score 
methods (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The goal of propensity 
score matching is to find a set of non-consultant control firms that can be optimally matched 
to the set of firms that have hired consultants (Imbens, 2000). The treatment (consultant) 
firms and the control group (non-consultant) firms are then made as statistically alike as 
possible by using a matching algorithm. This allows us to compare average CEO pay and 
incentives between the treatment and control groups because they are statistically alike in all 
other economically relevant characteristics.  
In principle, the propensity score method can isolate the effect of the treatment effect 
on the treated firm. Accordingly, we use a set of firm-level covariates that may be considered 
influences on managerial labour markets. We acknowledge that our conclusions are based 
entirely on the model specifications we use here. In other words, they match distributions 
based on the observable covariates in the model. This is the case for all propensity score 
matching studies. 
In addition, we investigate whether the financial crisis of 2008 altered the growth path 
of CEO pay in firms that use consultants. The financial crisis shone a spotlight on corporate 
governance practices, especially those regarding executive compensation (indeed, in the US, 
it led directly to changes in federal law that required firms to disclose information about pay 
consultants, namely the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010). Our approach is to estimate a difference-
in-differences model as follows: 
yi,t = aFirmi + b1Consultanti,t + b2Consultanti,t* Crisist + gControlsi,t + Yeart + ei,t    (4) 
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Crisist is an indicator variable that equals 1 during the 2008-2011 period. The 
coefficient on the interaction between Consultanti,t and Crisist (b2) represents the differential 
impact of compensation consultants on CEO pay since the financial crisis.  
Variable Measurements 
Regarding CEO pay level, we consider levels of salary, equity, and total compensation. 
Level of salary is the annual base pay. Level of equity is made up of the sum of shares 
awarded, the estimated value of options awarded, and any long-term incentive plan awarded 
during the fiscal year. Level of total compensation is measured as the annual sum of salary, 
bonus, and equity. CEO incentives are defined in various ways in the literature (Murphy, 
1999). A typical measure is the CEO pay mix. In terms of CEO incentives, we consider the 
proportion of salary and equity to total compensation.  
The term “Consultant” refers to the presence of compensation consultants, which is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm uses any compensation consultants, and 0 
otherwise. This is a commonly used variable in prior literature to examine the effect of 
compensation consultants (Conyon et al., 2009; Voulgaris et al., 2010). In terms of 
compensation policy quality, we capture firms with high quality by means of an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the ASSET4 score is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
In addition to the main explanatory variable, we also use a set of firm-level economic 
and corporate governance control variables	that have been found to affect CEO compensation 
(Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1985). In terms of firm-specific economic 
controls, firm size indicates organisational complexity and is proxied for by the logarithm of 
total assets. Firm performance reflects the potential alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests. This is measured by two variables: 1) total shareholder return captures market-
based performance, and 2) return on assets captures accounting-based performance. Firm 
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growth opportunity is measured by the market-to-book ratio. Firm risk is measured by stock 
volatility, which is the standard deviation of annualised monthly stock returns over the 
calendar year. We include firm risk because risk-averse CEOs may require greater 
compensation for higher risk-taking. Finally, leverage is included as a measure of the firm’s 
capital structure calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
In terms of corporate governance controls, board characteristics are captured by the 
logarithm of board size, the logarithm of compensation committee size, CEO-chair duality 
and the ratio of non-executive directors to all directors. CEOs’ quality (or perhaps skills and 
experience) are proxied by the logarithm of CEO age and the logarithm of CEO tenure. 
Ownership characteristics are captured by CEO ownership and institutional ownership. The 




Table 1 provides summary statistics relating to UK executive compensation consultants 
in 2011. The top half of the table focuses on firms that hire compensation consultants and 
shows the market share of the top consultants in 2011. The most prominent actor in the 
market is Hewitt New Bridge Street Consulting with a market share of 42%. The only other 
firm with a market share in excess of 20% is Towers Watson2 (22%). The bottom half of 
Table 1 shows the number of compensation consultants retained by a given firm in 2011. As 
the table shows, 144 firms in our sample did not have an external pay consultant in 2011, 
                                               
2 Towers Watson was formed from the merger of Towers Perrin and Watson Wyatt in 2010 and currently 
trades under the name Willis Towers Watson following the merger with Willis Group in 2016 
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while approximately half had only one consultant. 75 firms (16%) retained two consultants, 
and 17 firms (4%) retained four or more. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics pertaining to the main variables used 
in the study for the total sample. Average CEO salary compensation is approximately 
£388,000, and average CEO total compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, options, and other 
equity pay granted during the year) is approximately £1,449,000. We find that the percentage 
of total compensation comprised of salary is approximately 48%, while the percentage 
comprised of equity-based pay is approximately 33%. These findings correspond with those 
from previous UK studies, such as Conyon et al. (2009). Furthermore, consistent with Table 
1, we find that compensation consultants are present in about 72% of firms. We also consider 
their presence across different indices and find that it is a clear size effect. Smaller firms in 
our sample are much less likely to retain a compensation consultant. In detail, we find that 
94.6% of firms in the FTSE 100, 86.9% of firms in the FTSE 250, and 69.1% of firms in the 
FTSE Small Cap hire compensation consultants. This result is consistent with Conyon et al. 
(2009). Other controls are also consistent with previous studies that used UK data (e.g., Goh 
and Gupta, 2010; Kabir and Minhat, 2014).  
Panel B of Table 2 provides a summary of average value in terms of our key dependent 
and test variables between 2003 and 2011. There is an increasing trend of CEO compensation 
over our sample period. While all pay levels are increasing, the proportion of total 
compensation that consists of salary is decreasing, offset by an increased proportion of 
equity-linked compensation. As noted above, larger firms are more likely to retain a 
compensation consultant than smaller firms, however, whilst the decision to retain a 
compensation consultant differs within different share indexes, the within index patterns are 
quite stable over the period, notwithstanding a slight decrease towards the end. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents the univariate analysis on the key variables in this paper. We find that 
firms that hire compensation consultants pay their CEOs higher, with a higher proportion of 
equity pay and a lower proportion of salary pay. We also find that the independent variables 
differ between firms that hire consultants and those that do not. In detail, in terms of firm-
level characteristics, we find that firms that hire compensation consultants are larger, have 
better accounting performance but lower stock performance, have higher levels of leverage, 
and have higher market-to-book ratios. In terms of corporate governance characteristics, they 
generally have larger boards, a higher proportion of independent directors, no CEO duality, a 
larger compensation committee, and lower CEO and institutional ownership. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Regression Results 
Panel A of Table 4 investigates the relation between compensation consultants and 
CEO pay levels and incentives based on the OLS estimator with standard errors robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). We include panel A to show the CEO 
pay and consultant correlations in our data when we use methods similar to those in prior 
studies.  
In terms of CEO pay levels, panel A shows that the presence of consultants is positively 
correlated with CEO salary, equity compensation, and total compensation. This confirms 
Hypothesis 1a. In terms of CEO pay incentives, we find that the presence of compensation 
consultants is negatively correlated with the percentage of total pay made up of salary (non-
incentive element), and positively correlated with the percentage of equity (incentive 
element) in the CEO compensation contract. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1b 
and imply that consultants are more inclined to link CEO compensation contracts with firm 
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performance. The OLS results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Conyon et al., 2009; 
Voulgaris et al., 2010). 
Panels B and C in Table 4 present the regression estimates for CEO pay levels and 
incentives. They use firm- and CEO-fixed effects, respectively, to control for any unobserved 
but fixed heterogeneity across firms or CEOs.3 Both panels show that, once fixed effects are 
included, the effects of consultants on CEO compensation levels and incentives become 
statistically insignificant. This is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, and indicates that the 
positive findings in panel A, as well as prior research using OLS regression models, may be 
attributable to omitted variable problems rather than to the effects of consultants per se.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Firm- and CEO-level fixed effects control to some extent for the omitted variable bias 
because they filter out the permanent yet unobserved effects of a variable. However, an 
alternative solution is to use a propensity score matching approach, as described earlier, to 
control for any observable selection bias by the firm in retaining consultants. Propensity score 
matching proceeds in two steps.  
First, we estimate a probit model to determine the propensity score. Table 5 gives the 
estimates of the determinants of the presence of a compensation consultant. Column 1 
includes compensation, economic, and CEO characteristics; column 2 also includes 
governance characteristics. In terms of firm characteristics, firms with higher total assets, 
lower prior performance, and higher growth opportunities are more likely to use a consultant. 
In terms of compensation characteristics, we find that the percentage of equity pay is 
                                               
3 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting alternative fixed effects methods following Graham et al. 
(2011). We continue to find an insignificant impact of consultants on CEO pay by using the “spell-fixed effects 
methods,” with joint CEO-firm-fixed effects, as well as Graham et al.’s (2011) primary method, which separates 
manager- from firm-fixed effects. 
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positively correlated with the likelihood of using a consultant, while the coefficient on total 
wealth is negative, consistent with Chu et al. (2017). Furthermore, total compensation is 
positively correlated with the likelihood of using a consultant. This indicates that firms that 
already had higher total compensation were more likely to retain consultants, not that 
consultants drove up CEO total compensation. Most of the statistical and economic effects 
dampen when controlling for the corporate governance variables, which suggests it is 
important to consider the effect of corporate governance on CEO pay equations. Specifically, 
we find that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO is not also the 
chairman, larger compensation committees, and lower CEO and institutional ownership are 
more likely to hire a pay consultant. The results confirm the concern that the use of 
consultants is strongly endogenous to the observable covariates. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second, we compare the average treatment effects on the treated firms on CEO 
compensation levels and incentives between the consultant and non-consultant samples based 
on the model from column 2 of Table 5. We match like-for-like firms using a nearest 
neighbour algorithm with caliper 0.01 and no replacement. Table 6 presents the treatment 
effect of compensation consultants on compensation levels and incentives, based on the 
propensity score method.4 In general, after controlling for selection effects, we find that the 
pay differences remain statistically significant and the economic differences decrease 
dramatically. In fact, we note at least a 66% decrease across the different measures of CEO 
pay levels and incentives. The results in Table 6 imply thatdifferences in compensation and 
                                               
4 The covariate balance check provides confidence that the matching procedures effectively increase the 
similarity between the treatment and control groups, and that the selection bias has been significantly reduced 
after the matching procedure. Covariate balance tables are available from the authors upon request. 
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incentives between firms that use consultants and those that do not are driven largely by 
selection effects, rather than by the presence of the consultants alone. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Next, we investigate the effects of compensation consultants on CEO pay using a 
difference-in-ifferences estimator. The macro shock that ushered in the 2008 financial crisis 
brought public attention to the governance of publicly listed firms and highlighted how 
managerial incentives and pay are determined in the boardroom. According to the managerial 
power view, if consultants drove up CEO pay before the financial crisis, then we would 
expect firms with overpaid CEOs that retain consultants to reduce their CEO pay due to 
increased public outrage and regulatory scrutiny after the financial crisis.  
However, as Table 7 shows, our empirical results suggest otherwise. Compensation 
consultants have a positive and statistically significant effect on CEO pay after the onset of 
the financial crisis. On average, their presence is associated with an approximately 7.3% 
increase in CEO total compensation in the post-financial crisis period. This increase in pay is 
driven mainly by an increase in equity, not salary. Also, compared to firms that do not retain 
compensation consultants, CEO pay packages in firms that do have generally had a higher 
proportion of equity-based pay and a lower salary component since the financial crisis. This 
indicates that consultants are more likely to help improve CEO pay packages in order to align 
pay with performance after the sudden economic shock.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Next, we investigate the effects of compensation consultants on CEO pay and 
incentives using different subsamples (Hypothesis 3) based on the ASSET4 scores 
specifically for compensation policy quality. In Table 8, we find that the effect of 
compensation consultants on CEO pay is driven by their impact on firms with weak 
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compensation policies. The impacts are persistent in the weak compensation quality 
subsample across different regression models, in which the presence of a compensation 
consultant is positively correlated with an increased proportion of equity-based pay and a 
decreased proportion of fixed pay. The results indicate that compensation consultants may 
help firms with weak compensation quality by designing compensation structures that can 
better align the interests of managers and shareholders.  
Non-tabulated results suggest that the moderating effect varies when the subsamples are 
based on ASSET4 aggregated scores for general governance quality. Hence, our results 
complement prior literature by showing that the presence of a compensation consultant is 
more impactful in firms with weak compensation policies rather than weak corporate 
governance overall.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity  
Building on our main results, we further test the effect of compensation consultants on 
pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). We aim to determine whether the compensation contracts 
suggested by consultants are associated with firm performance. We consider both accounting 
and financial performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and stock returns, 
respectively. From the managerial power view, if consultants recommend favourable 
compensation packages that help managers extract wealth from shareholders, we would 
expect the presence of compensation consultants to be negatively correlated with PPS.  
In panel A of Table 9, we find a positive coefficient on the interaction “Consultant 1/0 
* ROA” in OLS, firm-, and CEO-fixed effects regressions. In panel B of Table 9, we also 
find a persistent positive coefficient on the interaction “Consultant 1/0 * Stock returns” 
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across all three regression models. The results suggest that firms with consultants compensate 
their CEOs with higher PPS than firms without consultants, which is inconsistent with the 
managerial power view.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Quantile Regressions  
We apply quantile regression methods to test whether the effect of compensation 
consultants differs at different quantiles of CEO pay distribution (this line of reasoning is 
motivated by Rees and Rodionova, 2015). We assume that the relationship we find between 
consultants and CEO pay could be due to compensation consultants having a direct influence 
on CEO pay, or to firms with certain pay levels being more likely to hire consultants.  
In Figure 1, we find no evidence that the impact of pay consultants on CEO incentive-
based pay is stronger for conditionally high compensation levels. We find relatively stable 
trends, with a slightly decreasing effect of compensation consultants on the level of salary 
and total compensation. This is inconsistent with the view that firms in higher pay percentiles 
use compensation consultants to justify their higher pay. We also find that the effect of 
compensation consultants on equity pay is more salient in firms with low to medium equity 
pay percentiles. This indicates that firms with lower levels of equity-based pay are more 
likely to benefit from retaining compensation consultants to design contracts that better align 
the interests between managers and shareholders. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Compensation Consultant Quality 
In addition to a firm’s decision whether to hire compensation consultants, we explore 
whether the quality of the consultant has an impact on CEO pay. Quality is based essentially 
on consultant firms’ market shares (see Table 1) and we define a “top 3 consultant” variable 
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that equals 1 if the firm uses a top 3 consultant (in terms of number of clients), and 0 
otherwise. In non-tabulated results, we find similar effects for both top 3 and non-top 3 
consultants on CEO compensation, suggesting there is no distinct style between bigger 
consultants and the rest. The results remain qualitatively similar if we use top 4 or top 5 
consultants.  
Determinants of Changes in Compensation Consultants  
The panel data enables us to examine whether the previous year’s CEO pay level or 
structure influence changes in compensation consultants. Specifically, we identify whether a 
firm changes its consultant by increasing/decreasing the number of consultants it retains, by 
changing from single to multiple consultants or vice versa, by switching the main consultant, 
or by starting to and ceasing to retain consultants. Our key test variables are previous year 
total compensation, total wealth, and percentage of equity-based pay. In non-tabulated 
results, we find no evidence that previous years’ compensation levels or structures influence 
changes in compensation consultants. This is inconsistent with the notion that firms tend to 
“opinion shop,” and with the “consultant repeat business” hypothesis. 
Internal Adviser 
We consider a firm’s use of an internal adviser to address the concern that the 
consultants effect on CEO pay might be affected by whether the firm has sufficient internal 
guidance in setting CEO already. We define an “Internal Adviser 1/0” equal to 1 if the firm 
has an internal adviser in place, and 0 otherwise. For 1,236 firm-year observations without 
compensation consultants, approximately 30% (374) have an internal adviser. We control for 
this and re-estimate our main regressions. Our results remain consistent with the view that 
having an internal adviser reduces the difference between firms that use a compensation 
consultant or not in pooled OLS regressions. However, the economic effect is small 
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compared to the effect of the compensation consultants. Both effects become insignificant 
once we control for fixed effects.  
Compensation Committee Characteristics  
Besides size, which is included in our main regressions, we also consider whether other 
compensation committee characteristics affect the impact of compensation consultants on 
CEO pay. First, we consider the independence of the compensation committee, proxied for by 
the proportion of non-executives on the committee (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The average 
proportion of independent members on a compensation committee is 0.82. We find that 
statistical significances vary across regression models, but, in general, the independence of 
the compensation committee is associated with higher levels of pay, higher proportions of 
equity-based pay, and lower proportions of salary. Second, we consider the experience of the 
compensation committee, as measured by the average age and tenure of committee members. 
We do not find any persistent association between compensation committee age or tenure on 
CEO pay. Overall, we find that the coefficients for the presence of compensation consultants 
reduce by controlling for additional compensation committee characteristics. However, the 
reduction of the coefficients is trivial, albeit sensitive to the model selection. 
FTSE 100, 250, and Small-Cap Indexes 
To provide further evidence, we re-estimate our pooled OLS and the firm- and CEO-
fixed effects regressions of our main results for observations in each FTSE index. For the 
FTSE 100 sample, we find no significant impact of compensation consultants even in pooled 
OLS regressions, which is likely to be the case because of the limited variation across these 
firms. In terms of the FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap samples, we find a statistically 
significant relation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay levels 
and incentives in pooled OLS regressions. However, these relations disappear once we 
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control for unobservable time-invariant variables by including firm- or CEO-fixed effects. 
Overall, our results are consistent with those in Table 4. 
Other Robustness Checks  
We also conduct further checks to ensure the robustness of our analysis. First, our 
results are not sensitive to considering the mergers and acquisitions event by leading 
consultants.5 Second, our results are robust to controlling for the CEO turnover event. Third, 
our main results hold when we use other measures to proxy for firm size instead of total 
assets, such as sales revenue and market capitalisation.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Prior studies have asserted that CEO pay is positively correlated with compensation 
consultants. This is often interpreted as “managerial power,” and suggests that CEOs may 
have captured the pay-setting process for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders. In 
other words, executive pay consultants are seen as facilitating managerial rent-seeking. If this 
is the case, one potential policy response would be to regulate consultants or impose further 
disclosure requirements on firms. Our paper provides empirical evidence to help inform this 
debate.   
We document the following empirical results. First, the pooled OLS results show that 
CEO pay is positively correlated with the presence of compensation consultants. This finding 
is consistent with extant studies. However, we find that the OLS results are sensitive to the 
model specification. Specifically, the effect of compensation consultants on the level of CEO 
                                               
5 Hewitt Associates acquired New Bridge Street Consultants LLP (Previously Advisor) on 18 March 2008 to 
form Hewitt New Bridge Street; Towers Perrin merged with Watson Wyatt in 2009 (announced on 28 June 
2009, completed on 4 January 2010) to form Towers Watson. 
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pay and structure of CEO incentives becomes insignificant after controlling for firm- or 
CEO-level fixed effects.  
Second, since the OLS and fixed effect regressions are potentially contaminated by 
issues such as the endogenous selection of compensation consultants, we provide more 
compelling evidence using propensity score matching and the average treatment effect on the 
treated estimator. We also leverage the financial crises as an exogenous shock and explore 
difference-in-differences estimators of the effect of consultants on CEO pay. Both these 
approaches show once again, a positive link between CEO pay and the presence of a 
consultant, as well as the CEO equity pay mix and the presence of a pay consultant. The 
economic magnitude of the effect, though, is smaller compared to the OLS results. The 
propensity score matching, average treatment effect on the treated and difference-in-
differences estimator collectively provide strong evidence that consultants do indeed 
influence pay levels and the design of CEO compensation packages.  
Third, we find evidence that compensation consultants matter in CEO compensation 
design when their expertise is more likely to be important. Specifically, we find that the 
presence of compensation consultants is positively associated with CEO total compensation 
in firms with weak compensation policy quality. Again, we show that the impact is mainly 
driven by an increase proportion of equity-based pay. This is consistent with shareholder-
management alignment. 
Fourth, additional analysis shows a positive relation between consultants and CEO pay-
performance sensitivity, indicating that CEO pay is more linked to performance in firms that 
retain compensation consultants. The paper also conducts a battery of additional analysis 
including quantile regressions, compensation consultants’ quality, determinants of changes in 
compensation consultants, internal adviser, compensation committee characteristics, specific 
indexes (FTSE100, 250 and small-cap indexes), as well as other robustness checks. Overall, 
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our paper provides a wealth of new empirical evidence on the role of compensation 
consultants in UK firms. 
 
Our paper inevitably contains limitations that might form the basis for future research. 
First, we recognise the potential differences between the US and the UK in terms of corporate 
governance features and executive compensation practices. This raises the question of 
whether our results are generalizable to the US market or, indeed, other European markets. 
Second, due to data limitations, we are not able to examine whether other important factors, 
such as activist investors or pension funds, affect how compensation consultants influence 
CEO pay. Third, the effect of consultants was measured by their presence not their other 
characteristics. Further studies might explore the effect of consultant heterogeneity (e.g., 
consultant background, type, demographic, prior experience, consultant fee, etc.). Fourth, 
while we find evidence that the positive link between compensation consultants and CEO pay 
is driven by the equity portion of pay, we cannot rule out the possibility that compensation 
consultants might be using equity-based schemes with easy-to-achieve performance hurdles 
in designing CEO compensation package. Therefore, it appears that the link between 
compensation consultants and CEO pay is complex and cannot be easily explained by either 
optimal contracting view or managerial powerful alone. 
Overall, this paper provides substantial new evidence on the role of compensation 
consultants. The empirical findings show that compensation consultants have numerous, 
complex effects on CEO pay and our results show that it is critical to control for the 
endogenous selection of compensation consultants to explain CEO pay outcomes. We 
strongly encourage further future research in this area.   
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
This appendix defines the variables used in the paper. Economic variables come from Datastream, corporate 
governance and compensation data come from BoardEx, Corporate governance score and compensation policy 




Log salary The log of base annual pay (BoardEx item: Salary) 
Log equity The log of equity-linked pay (BoardEx item: Equity-linked) 
Log total compensation The log of the sum of: Salary, Bonus, Equity-linked (BoardEx item: Total 
Compensation) 
Salary % Salary as a proportion of total compensation (BoardEx item: Salary/Total 
Compensation) 
Equity % Equity-linked pay as a proportion of total compensation (BoardEx item: 
Equity-Linked/Total Compensation) 
Log total wealth The log of the value of cumulative holdings over time of stock, options, and 
LTIPs for the CEO (BoardEx item: Total Wealth) 
Compensation consultants 
Consultant 1/0 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm uses any compensation 
consultants, and 0 otherwise 
Firm characteristics 
Log total assets The log of total assets (Datastream item: Total Assets (WC02999)) 
Stock returns (1 year) [(RIt/RIt-1)-1]*100% (Datastream item: Total Return Index (RI)) 
ROA Net income divided by total assets (Datastream item: Net Income Before 
Preferred Dividends (WC01651)/Total Assets (WC02999)) 
Stock volatility A measure of a stock's average annual price movement to a high and a low 
from a mean price for each year (Datastream item: Price Volatility 
(WC08806)) 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets (Datastream item: Total Debt % Total 
Capital (WC08221)) 
Market to book Market value of ordinary equity divided by the balance sheet value of 
ordinary equity in the company (Datastream item: Market To Book Value 
(MTBV) 
Governance characteristics 
Log of board size The log of total number of directors on the board (BoardEx item: Total 
Directors on the Board) 
Non-executive ratio The number of non-executive directors over the total number of directors on 
the board (BoardEx item: Number of Independent NED on Board/Total 
Directors on the Board) 
CEO is chairman An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman, and 0 
otherwise (BoardEx item: Combined role of CEO & Chairman is present) 
Log comp. comm. size The log of total number of remuneration committee members (BoardEx item: 
Remuneration/Compensation Committee Size) 
CEO turnover An indicator variable that equals 1 if there was CEO turnover during the 
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Corporate governance 
score 
The measure of a company’s systems and processes that ensures its board 
members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term shareholders. 
It reflects a company’s capacity, through its use of best management 
practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities to the creation of 
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incentives, as well as checks and balances, in order to generate long-term 
shareholder value. The original score ranges from 0 to 100. High (Low) 
corporate governance quality is defined as above (below) sample median. 
(ASSET4 item: CGVSCORE) 
Compensation policy 
score 
The board of directors/compensation policy category measures a company's 
management commitment and effectiveness to following best practice 
corporate governance principles related to competitive and proportionate 
management compensation. It reflects a company’s capacity to attract and 
retain executives and board members with the necessary skills by linking their 
compensation to individual or companywide financial or extra-financial 
targets. The original score ranges from 0 to 100. High (Low) compensation 
policy quality is defined as above (below) sample median. (ASSET4 item: 
CGCP) 
CEO characteristics  
Log of CEO age The log of CEO age (BoardEx item: Age (Yrs)) 
Log of CEO tenure The log of the number of years the CEO has held the role at the firm 




Table 1. UK Compensation consultants 
This table presents the market share of the primary consultants, as well as the distribution of the number of 
consultants based on 469 FTSE All-Share firms in 2011. Compensation consultant data come from Manifest, 
own calculations. 
 
Consultant name Market share in 2011 
Hewitt New Bridge Street Consulting 0.42 








Number of pay consultants Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 144 30.7 30.7 
1 202 43.07 73.77 
2 75 15.99 89.77 
3 31 6.61 96.38 
4 or more 17 3.62 100 
    




Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of key variables. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. 
Compensation levels and total assets are in thousands of GBP. Age and tenure are in years. CEO ownership and 
institutional ownership are in percentages. 
Panel A: Total sample 
Variable Number Mean Std Dev Median 
Salary 4480 387.50 238.41 335.00 
Equity-linked compensation 4480 784.72 2196.47 245.50 
Total compensation 4480 1448.60 2519.06 780 
Salary % 4480 0.48 0.27 0.43 
Equity % 4480 0.33 0.27 0.35 
Consultant 1/0 4480 0.72 0.45 1.00 
Total assets 4480 12123.85 95153.24 403.10 
Stock returns (1-year) 4480 0.18 0.66 0.12 
ROA 4480 0.02 0.13 0.04 
Stock volatility 4480 0.33 0.12 0.31 
Leverage 4480 0.34 0.3 0.31 
Market to book 4480 2.36 3.85 1.72 
Board size 4480 8.20 2.59 8.00 
Non-executive ratio 4480 0.49 0.15 0.5 
CEO is chairman 4480 0.22 0.42 0.00 
Compensation committee size 4480 3.48 1.09 3.00 
Age 4480 51.51 7.02 51.00 
Tenure 4480 5.53 5.68 3.80 
CEO ownership 4480 4.92 14.81 0.28 
Institutional ownership 4480 23.18 20.7 18.39 
Corporate governance pillar score 2069 71.82 17.36 74.89 
Compensation policy quality 2069 75.24 15.32 80.05 
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Panel B: By year 
Year Salary Equity Total compensation Salary % Equity % Consultant 1/0 
      
All 
Sample FTSE 100 FTSE 250 
FTSE 
Small Cap 
2003 318.95 429.01 910.04 0.55 0.28 0.73 0.96 0.87 0.70 
2004 328.52 487.06 1011.43 0.54 0.28 0.74 0.99 0.85 0.73 
2005 350.80 737.88 1316.94 0.51 0.31 0.73 0.96 0.87 0.69 
2006 371.73 678.27 1330.89 0.46 0.34 0.74 0.93 0.90 0.67 
2007 398.51 978.49 1727.36 0.42 0.36 0.74 0.95 0.89 0.70 
2008 422.65 704.27 1436.34 0.49 0.32 0.72 0.89 0.88 0.66 
2009 431.92 963.39 1684.51 0.48 0.36 0.72 0.94 0.86 0.73 
2010 439.79 1112.27 1911.81 0.44 0.38 0.70 0.95 0.85 0.67 
2011 451.83 1088.28 1886.05 0.44 0.38 0.69 0.95 0.84 0.65 
          
Total 387.50 784.72 1448.60 0.48 0.33 0.72 0.95 0.87 0.69 
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Table 3. Univariate analysis 
This table presents a univariate analysis of the key variables. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. 
Compensation level and total assets are in thousands of GBP. Age and tenure are in years. CEO ownership and 
institutional ownership are in percentages. 
 
  Consultant 1/0   
  No (0) Yes (1) Difference (0)-(1) t-stat 
Salary 269.5 432.5 -163.0*** (-21.47) 
Equity-linked compensation 265.5 982.5 -717.1*** (-9.871) 
Total compensation 693.3 1736.4 -1043.0*** (-12.60) 
Salary % 0.617 0.432 0.185*** (21.21) 
Equity % 0.211 0.377 -0.166*** (-19.25) 
Total assets 606.8 16512.0 -15905.2*** (-5.014) 
Stock returns (1-year) 0.211 0.166 0.0454** (2.072) 
ROA 0.006 0.030 -0.0251*** (-5.665) 
Stock volatility 0.372 0.312 0.0599*** (15.73) 
Leverage 0.247 0.371 -0.124*** (-12.65) 
Market to book 2.043 2.482 -0.439*** (-3.418) 
Board size 7.018 8.648 -1.630*** (-19.60) 
Non-executive ratio 0.416 0.512 -0.0967*** (-19.98) 
CEO is chairman 0.363 0.169 0.194*** (14.26) 
Compensation committee size 2.939 3.686 -0.748*** (-21.60) 
Age 51.18 51.63 -0.453* (-1.929) 
Tenure 5.870 5.397 0.474** (2.498) 
CEO ownership 7.752 3.840 3.913*** (7.957) 





Table 4. Compensation consultants and CEO pay levels and incentives 
This table presents results for the effect of consultants on CEO pay levels and incentives using pooled OLS, and 
firm-, and CEO-fixed effect regressions. A full set of firm-specific economic characteristics, CEO 
characteristics, and corporate governance controls are included, but are not reported for simplicity (available 
upon request). Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Log salary Log equity 
Log total 
compensation Salary % Equity % 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Pooled OLS regressions 
Consultant 1/0 0.168*** 0.868*** 0.224*** -0.067*** 0.058*** 
 (6.067) (9.033) (7.648) (-7.199) (6.260) 
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 
R-squared 0.429 0.396 0.599 0.352 0.271 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Panel B: Firm-fixed effects regressions 
Consultant 1/0 0.001 0.011 0.051 -0.024* 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.067) (1.290) (-1.684) (0.660) 
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 
R-squared 0.163 0.077 0.246 0.129 0.068 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firms 748 748 748 748 748 
      
Panel C: CEO-fixed effects regressions 
Consultant 1/0 -0.018 -0.113 0.051 -0.018 0.007 
 (-0.467) (-0.692) (1.277) (-1.216) (0.430) 
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 
R-squared 0.190 0.050 0.270 0.121 0.048 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of CEOs 1,236 1,236 1,236 1,236 1,236 
      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
41 
Table 5. The determinants of the presence of compensation consultants 
This table presents probit regression results on the determinants of the presence of compensation consultants. 
Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Consultant 1/0 
 (1) (2) 
Log of total compensation (t-1) 0.331*** 0.241*** 
 (7.855) (5.498) 
Log of total wealth (t-1) -0.037** -0.014 
 (-2.450) (-0.792) 
Equity % (t-1) 0.326*** 0.259** 
 (2.705) (2.074) 
Log of total assets (t-1) 0.253*** 0.179*** 
 (10.439) (6.464) 
Stock returns (1 year) (t-1) -0.080** -0.069* 
 (-2.193) (-1.857) 
ROA (t-1) -0.194 -0.134 
 (-0.958) (-0.647) 
Market to book value (t-1) 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (3.535) (3.342) 
Stock volatility (t-1) -0.616** -0.650** 
 (-2.269) (-2.354) 
Leverage (t-1) 0.294*** 0.362*** 
 (3.006) (3.586) 
Log of CEO age (t-1) 0.351* 0.542*** 
 (1.817) (2.711) 
Log of CEO tenure (t-1) 0.020 0.019 
 (0.556) (0.520) 
Log of board size (t-1)  0.201 
  (1.423) 
Non-executive ratio (t-1)  1.008*** 
  (4.897) 
CEO is chairman (t-1)  -0.318*** 
  (-5.108) 
Log of comp. comm. size (t-1)  0.439*** 
  (3.135) 
CEO ownership (t-1)  -0.003* 
  (-1.682) 
Institutional ownership (t-1)  -0.003** 
  (-2.141) 
Constant -4.428*** -5.738*** 
 (-5.216) (-6.449) 
Observations 3670 3670 
Pseudo R-squared 0.224 0.254 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes 




Table 6. Treatment effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay levels and incentives 
This table presents the results of propensity score matching on CEO pay levels and incentives. ATT is short for 
average treatment on the treated. Treated = 731. We use a nearest neighbour algorithm with caliper 0.01 and no 
replacement, and we restrict the observations to be on the common pillar. 
 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. t-stat 
Log salary Unmatched 5.94 5.31 0.63 0.03 21.78 
 ATT 5.62 5.51 0.11 0.04 2.66 
Log equity Unmatched 5.25 2.75 2.50 0.10 25.14 
 ATT 4.02 3.18 0.84 0.15 5.68 
Log total compensation Unmatched 6.99 6.04 0.95 0.04 25.84 
 ATT 6.44 6.27 0.17 0.05 3.58 
Salary % Unmatched 0.42 0.61 -0.19 0.01 -19.80 
 ATT 0.52 0.58 -0.06 0.01 -4.34 
Equity % Unmatched 0.39 0.21 0.18 0.01 18.63 





Table 7. The impact of compensation consultants on CEO pay around the 2008 financial 
crisis 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of consultants on CEO pay levels and incentives around 
the global financial crisis. Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 for periods between 2008 and 2011. Variable 
definitions are provided in the appendix. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Log salary Log equity 
Log total 
compensation Salary % Equity % 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Consultant 1/0 0.025 -0.126 0.025 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.638) (-0.756) (0.588) (-0.848) (-0.426) 
Consultant 1/0 * Crisis -0.066* 0.369** 0.070* -0.030** 0.048*** 
 (-1.784) (2.346) (1.778) (-2.092) (2.991) 
Log of total assets 0.116*** 0.371*** 0.176*** -0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (5.222) (3.966) (7.496) (-3.071) (2.775) 
Stock returns (1 year) 0.006 0.291*** 0.151*** -0.060*** 0.043*** 
 (0.483) (5.449) (11.284) (-12.203) (7.947) 
ROA 0.007 1.161*** 0.450*** -0.221*** 0.088** 
 (0.087) (3.422) (5.289) (-7.039) (2.536) 
Stock volatility 0.081 -1.788** -0.424** 0.237*** -0.110 
 (0.423) (-2.216) (-2.095) (3.171) (-1.336) 
Leverage -0.050 0.063 -0.112** 0.032 0.001 
 (-0.996) (0.298) (-2.100) (1.633) (0.023) 
Market to book -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.707) (-0.074) (-0.411) (0.818) (-0.115) 
Log of board size 0.046 0.886*** 0.124 -0.028 0.079** 
 (0.626) (2.882) (1.608) (-0.989) (2.515) 
Non-executive ratio 0.297*** 1.405*** 0.339*** -0.083** 0.069 
 (2.891) (3.242) (3.121) (-2.067) (1.552) 
CEO is chairman -0.163*** -0.279* -0.114*** 0.011 0.005 
 (-4.802) (-1.949) (-3.171) (0.793) (0.319) 
Log comp. comm. size 0.034 0.112 0.032 0.008 0.012 
 (0.590) (0.459) (0.528) (0.335) (0.472) 
Log of age -0.302*** -2.419*** -0.542*** 0.225*** -0.150*** 
 (-2.708) (-5.131) (-4.584) (5.163) (-3.113) 
Log of tenure 0.275*** 0.087 0.160*** 0.018*** -0.030*** 
 (17.759) (1.324) (9.782) (2.984) (-4.508) 
CEO ownership 0.000 -0.001 0.002** -0.001* 0.000 
 (0.138) (-0.162) (2.037) (-1.687) (0.796) 
Institutional ownership -0.000 -0.010*** -0.001 0.001*** -0.001** 
 (-0.425) (-3.464) (-1.601) (3.489) (-2.227) 
Constant 5.649*** 9.776*** 7.327*** -0.278 0.640*** 
 (11.873) (4.868) (14.546) (-1.497) (3.121) 
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 
R-squared 0.163 0.079 0.246 0.130 0.070 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firms 748 748 748 748 748 
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Table 8. Subsample analysis of compensation policy quality 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of consultants on CEO pay level and incentives in 
subsamples based on ASSET4 scores of compensation policy quality. Our sample is reduced to 2,069 firm-years 
due to data availability of ASSET4. We define high quality (n=1,035) as those with scores above the sample 
median, and low (n=1,304) otherwise. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Log salary Log equity 
Log total 
compensation Salary % Equity % 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Pooled OLS regressions 
High 0.012 0.382 -0.043 0.002 0.052** 
 (0.349) (1.547) (-0.558) (0.098) (2.272) 
Low 0.044 1.039*** 0.115 -0.084*** 0.094*** 
 (0.631) (4.107) (1.584) (-3.451) (4.003) 
Industry-fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Firm-fixed effects regressions 
High -0.023 -0.197 -0.056 0.020 -0.023 
 (-0.386) (-0.575) (-0.650) (0.679) (-0.651) 
Low 0.001 0.759* 0.175 -0.067* 0.129*** 
 (0.013) (1.713) (1.482) (-1.787) (2.820) 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: CEO-fixed effects regressions 
High -0.089 0.029 0.038 -0.023 0.026 
 (-1.396) (0.075) (0.410) (-0.734) (0.653) 
Low -0.105 0.794 0.211 -0.099** 0.132** 
 (-1.113) (1.581) (1.638) (-2.308) (2.499) 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9. Compensation consultants and CEO pay performance sensitivity 
This table presents regression results for the effect of consultants on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Firm accounting and financial performance are measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and stock returns, respectively. A set of firm-specific economic characteristics, CEO characteristics, and corporate governance controls are included, but are not 
reported for simplicity. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Return on assets (ROA) 
  OLS Firm-fixed effect CEO-fixed effect 
  Log equity 
Log total 
compensation Log equity 
Log total 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Consultant 1/0 0.842*** 0.217*** -0.000 0.049 -0.130 0.048 
 (8.766) (7.362) (-0.003) (1.246) (-0.794) (1.201) 
ROA -0.890* 0.125 0.164 0.293** 0.188 0.464*** 
 (-1.890) (0.779) (0.341) (2.428) (0.362) (3.629) 
Consultant 1/0 * ROA 2.285*** 0.628*** 1.367*** 0.215* 1.165** 0.211* 
 (4.484) (3.761) (2.897) (1.817) (2.288) (1.680) 
       
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 
R-squared 0.400 0.601 0.079 0.246 0.052 0.270 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No 
CEO-fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Stock returns 
  OLS Firm-fixed effects CEO-fixed effects 
 Log equity 
Log total 
compensation Log equity 
Log total 
compensation Log equity 
Log total 
compensation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Consultant 1/0 0.814*** 0.203*** -0.059 0.030 -0.191 0.026 
 (8.337) (6.794) (-0.372) (0.761) (-1.163) (0.648) 
Stock returns 0.363*** 0.167*** 0.275*** 0.174*** 0.179* 0.141*** 
 (2.864) (3.899) (2.643) (6.722) (1.688) (5.440) 
Consultant 1/0 * Stock returns 0.335** 0.129*** 0.353*** 0.107*** 0.372*** 0.122*** 
 (2.253) (2.658) (2.827) (3.448) (2.961) (3.975) 
       
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480 
R-squared 0.400 0.605 0.086 0.263 0.059 0.289 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No 




Figure 1. Quantile analysis of the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay level 
This figure presents the quantile analysis of the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay. The horizontal 
scale represents the quantiles of the dependent variables; the vertical scale represents the estimated coefficient 
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